

140  
3

25

Approved for Release  
July 2000

SECRET 25 SEP 70 CITE SANTIN

1. ON [REDACTED] REPORTED THAT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IN TALK WITH PRES. FREI, ON [REDACTED] LEARNED THAT FREI, TO ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES, RULES OUT PARLIAMENTARY DENIAL OF PRESIDENCY TO ALLENDE. ALSO, FREI NOW QUESTIONS ADVISABILITY OF REPLACING CIVILIAN MINISTERS WITH MILITARY BECAUSE LATTER MIGHT LET CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES TAKE THEIR NORMAL COURSE AND PERMIT ALLENDE TO BE ELECTED BY CONGRESS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ACCOUNT OF FREI'S CURRENT VIEWS SUBSTANTIALLY CONFIRMED BY [REDACTED].

2. ACCORDING [REDACTED] REPORT HAS SERVED TO HARDEN PN'S SUSPICIONS THAT FREI ATTEMPTING TO USE THEM AS CATSPAW IN DEVIOUS AND AIMLESS POLITICAL GAME.

3. GUSTAVO ALESSANDRI, PRIOR NATIONAL HOLIDAY, MET WITH EX-PRIME MINISTER RUMOR IN ROME AND PRESUMABLY RECEIVED BRIEFING ALONG LINES [REDACTED]

4. ACCORDING [REDACTED] 24 SEP, PN LACKS MEANINGFUL LEVERAGE WITH CHILEAN ARMY, EXCEPT THROUGH FREI. ABOVE TALK

3

PAGE 2 SANTOS [REDACTED] S E C R E T

WITH FREI, HAS CONVINCED [REDACTED] ET.AL. THAT FREI DOES NOT HAVE THE SLIGHTEST INTENTION OF GETTING RID OF SCHNEIDER, LET ALONE OF INDUCING THE ARMED FORCES TO STEP IN. FOR PURPOSES ITS OWN CONTINGENCY PLANNING, PN NOW RULES OUT MILITARY INTERVENTION AND, LACKING REQUISITE INSTRUMENTALITIES, DOES NOT PROPOSE TO PURSUE THIS MATTER ANY FURTHER.

[REDACTED] WAS LEFT IN NO DOUBT THAT WE STRONGLY FAVOR MILITARY SOLUTION, WITH OR WITHOUT FREI.

5. [REDACTED] GENTLY BROACHED TO FREI POSSIBILITY OF HIS RESIGNING THE PRESIDENCY. FREI PROVED UNRECEPTIVE.

6. STATION AWAITING RESULTS OF BRIEFING OF ARMY GENERALS BY SCHNEIDER. THIS BRIEFING, COMBINED WITH ZALDIVAR'S REPORT ON CHILEAN ECONOMY, MIGHT PROVOKE GENERALS INTO OPENLY CHALLENGING SCHNEIDER DOCTRINE. IF ANYTHING, FREI'S TALK WITH SCHNEIDER MAY HAVE DEPRIVED LATTER OF FACILE ALIBI THAT CHILEAN MESS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ESSENTIALLY "CIVILIAN" AFFAIR.

7. YOUR POINT IN [REDACTED] WELL TAKEN.  
CHILEAN COUP, IF IT TAKES PLACE, WILL HAVE "NO REVOLU-

PAGE 3 [REDACTED] S E C R E T

TIONARY MYSTIQUE OF ITS OWN" AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CLIMATE  
ONLY MILDLY ENCOURAGING. NOTHING OF SIGNIFICANT NATURE CAN  
BE DONE BY STATION TO RESOLVE THAT PROBLEM WITHIN THE TIME  
SPAN AND WITH THE INSTRUMENTALITIES STILL AVAILABLE.

8. PRIOR ELECTIONS, GEN CAMILO VALE OZUELA  
TOLD [REDACTED] THAT HIS AND HIS FAMILY'S FUTURE SERIOUSLY  
PREOCCUPY HIM, SHOULD HE ACTIVELY BECOME INVOLVED IN ABORTIVE  
COUP ATTEMPT. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] LATTER DOES NOT COMMAND TROOPS AND CAN THEREFORE  
NOT BE USED TO KICK OFF MINI-COUP. WHAT HE COULD BE ASKED  
TO DO, HOWEVER, IS TO PUT IN FOR PROMPT RETIREMENT ON GROUNDS  
OF PROFOUND AND CONSCIENTIOUS DISAGREEMENTS WITH SCHNEIDER  
DOCTRINE. HE COULD COMBINE THIS, WITH FLAMING APPEAL TO  
OFFICER CORPS NOT TO PERMIT CHILE TO FALL INTO COMMUNIST  
HANDS. THERE NO DOUBT, HIS DECLARATION WOULD PROVE  
PROFOUNDLY UNSETTLING AND COULD SPLIT THE ARMY WIDE OPEN.  
IT COULD ALSO BE USED TO MAKE FREI'S POSITION IN CHILE  
UNTEENABLE, IF IT EXCORIATES HIM AS CHILE'S GRAVEDIGGER. IT

[REDACTED]

3

PAGE 4 SANTIAGO SECRET

WOULD BE IN THE NATURE OF A LAST, DESPERATE MOVE WHOSE CONSEQUENCES IT MAY BE DIFFICULT TO ACCURATELY PREDICT. IT COULD BACKFIRE. WE SHOULD PONDER IT AND KEEP IT IN RESERVE.

9. SUGGEST YOU READ [REDACTED] SEP 70 (ARMY DIVIDED REGARDING ALLENDE VICTORY). [REDACTED]

SECRET